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O
n 16 October 2000 the Advisory and 
Monitoring Group of the OSCE in Minsk 
declared that the parliamentary elections, 
which took place in the Republic of Belarus on 15 
October, did not meet international standards for 
democratic elections. In addition the US 
Department of State has also refused to recognize 
the validity of the elections and will continue to 
regard the Parliament of the 13th Session, dissolved 
by President Lukashenka in late 1996, as the 
legitimate parliament of Belarus. The chairman of 
that parliament, Semyon Sharetsky, left Belarus in 
the summer of 1999, fearing for his safety. A second 
round of the elections took place on 29 October, 
resulting in the election of 97 deputies in the 110- 
seat assembly. It may take a further three months 
for the remaining thirteen seats to be filled.
The elections have been the subject of 
considerable debate among all factions of the 
political spectrum in Belarus since they were 
announced last summer. A division occurred among 
the opposition between those who felt that the only 
logical step was to boycott the elections—led by 
politicians such as Anatolii Lebedka, the chairman 
of the United Civic Party, and Vintsuk Vyachorka, 
the leader of the Belarusian Popular Front—and 
those who have maintained that it was important for 
opposition leaders to gain a foothold in state 
structures by means of the assembly—such as 
Nikolay Statkevich, the leader of the Social 
Democratic Party, and Henadz Hrushavy, the 
chairman of the largest NGO in Minsk, “For the 
Children of Chernobyl.” These leaders planned to 
run as independent candidates, without official 
backing from their respective parties, believing that 
the elections might orient the populace to 
democratic values.
The OSCE and the Dialogue
The decision of Statkevich and Hrushavy was 
supported by the OSCE’s Advisory and Monitoring 
Group in Minsk, led by Ambassador Hans Georg
Wieck, which has maintained that the opposition 
should gain a foothold in the official structures and 
advocated a mass turnout at the polling booths as a 
form of public protest. The role of the OSCE AMB 
has itself caused dissension among the opposition,1 
some of whom have maintained that the 
organization is in this way promoting the 
government’s cause. At issue are the results of an 
agreement made between President Alyaksander 
Lukashenka and the OSCE at a summit in Istanbul, 
Turkey, in November 1999, during which 
Lukashenka agreed to develop a serious “dialogue” 
with the opposition, thereby (it was hoped) bringing 
to an end the impasse between the two sides, which 
dates back to the November 1996 referendum by 
which the president amended the 1994 Constitution 
to enhance his own powers and conversely to 
reduce that of the Supreme Soviet. Though Western 
states in general did not recognize the validity of the 
changes made by Lukashenka, or the legality of the 
referendum through which he engineered them, the 
OSCE AMG in Minsk worked steadily to encourage 
Lukashenka to open the dialogue with the 
opposition.
The agreement made in Istanbul obliged 
Lukashenka to fulfill four conditions:
• To allow the opposition access to the 
official media;
• To give legislative authority to the 
parliament;
• To provide a democratic election code;
• To end political repression that has seen 
the arrest and detention of many activists, 
in addition to the disappearance of several 
prominent oppositionists.
Most notably the Conservative Christian Part)' of 
the Belarusian Popular Front, led by the former BPF leader, 




Lukashenka accepted the notion of consultation and 
appointed M. Sazonov as the negotiator for the 
government side. The opposition leaders discovered 
in practice that it was impossible for the disparate 
political leaders to sit at the same table. They 
included, for example, the chairman of the Liberal 
Democratic Party, Haydukevich, the chairman of 
the Communist Party, Kalyakin, and the leaders of 
the United Civic Party and the Belarusian Popular 
Front (BPF), which itself divided into two branches 
in 1999. Kalyakin’s Communists supported 
integration with Russia whereas the other parties 
were anxious to protect Belarusian statehood. 
Haydukevich’s party was virtually a branch of the 
Russian party of the same name led by Zhirinovsky. 
On Lukashenka’s side there was also some cause for 
concern. The logical outcome of the Dialogue was 
the emergence of a group of democratic leaders, 
with access to the official media, who might 
eventually be elected to parliament and form a 
strong enough bloc to prevent the ratification of a 
Union Treaty with Russia. Thus the president 
resolved to limit the discussions to a few leaders 
with whom he could deal adequately or who in 
general supported the same long-term goals as the 
government. These included the Yabloko party run 
by Olga Abramova and the Liberal Democrats. 
Sazonov was eventually dismissed from his post as 
the government spokesman and the talks broke 
down.
Under these circumstances, and with the political 
situation at an impasse, the opposition had to make 
a decision whether to participate in the 
parliamentary elections. An important marker in 
reaching a decision was the All-Belarusian Congress, 
held in Minsk in the summer of 2000. The OSCE’s 
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights sent a small technical group to Belarus to 
observe the elections, while pointing out that this 
group did not constitute official recognition of the 
validity of the elections. The Lukashenka 
government, however, purported to believe 
otherwise, choosing to regard the delegation as ipso 
facto recognition of the electoral process. The 
United States, which recently held Senate hearings 
about the political repressions in Belarus, took a 
hostile stance from the outset and dechned to send 
any observers.
Prior to the election, on 15 September, the 
Central Electoral Commission, under the 
chairmanship of Lidziya Yarmoshyna, rejected the
registration of over 60 democratic candidates on the 
grounds that some of the signatures they had 
collected were invaHd, or else they had given 
incorrect information about their financial situation. 
Those rejected included virtually all the prominent 
candidates from the wing of the opposition 
movement that supported the elections (Statkevich 
and former Prime Minister MikhaE Chyhir were the 
notable exceptions). Supporters of Hrushavy, for 
example, had reportedly collected more than 40 
times the required number of signatures for their 
candidate. Further, another 200 candidates were not 
permitted to run by local election commissions. 
Those de-registered took their case to the Supreme 
Court, which subsequently upheld the decisions of 
the central and local commissions. Those poEticians 
excluded in this fashion then joined in the general 
boycott caUed for by the opposition.
Opposition leaders reported more evidence of 
electoral indiscretions. The opposition sent 
observers into most of the electoral districts in the 
period 10-15 October. According to Viachorka, 20 
percent of the ballots in the Hrodna region were 
cast before 15 October and in Enproper fashion. 
Students from the Belarusian State Economic 
University and the Belarusian University of Culture 
reported that their faculties were under acute 
pressure to halt classes and force the students to 
vote. Many professors beEeved that they would lose 
their jobs otherwise. The Vyasna human rights 
center—s chairman, Ales Belyatsky, noted that the 
electoral commissions indiscriminately removed 
names from the register and aUowed numerous 
people to vote without showing identification. The 
Electoral Commission itself was formed by the 
government and included very few members from 
opposition groups. Notably, despite what appeared 
to be obvious falsifications of the election results in 
several constituencies, not a single member of the 
Commission ever admitted to such in the 
independent press or before the courts.
According to Yarmoshyna, the official electoral 
turnout was 60.6 percent, thus weU above the 
minimum requirement of 50 percent, and this 
despite a decision by the more radical opposition 
members to boycott the elections. Official figures 
indicate that the 50 percent total was reached or 
exceeded in 96 out of 110 electoral districts, with 14 
districts declared invaEd because of insufficient 
voters. Of these 14 districts, 5 were in the Brest 
region, 4 in Vitsebsk, and 3 in the city of Minsk.
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Notably, whereas the 43 candidates who received an 
outright majority in the first round included 22 
members of the former parliament (Lukashenka 
version) and leaders of the KGB and Union of 
Patriotic Youth, those with invalidated ballots 
included Statkevich of the Social Democratic Party 
and Serhy Haydukevych, leader of the Liberal 
Democratic Party of Belarus.
None of the prominent opposition candidates 
(with the exception of Abramova) fared very well. 
Chyhir received 23 percent of the vote, well behind 
Natalia Masherova, daughter of the former 
Communist Party leader of Belarus (Petr 
Masherov), who received 48 percent. According to 
the authorities, Haydukevich received 10 percent of 
the vote in his riding, which left him in last place. 
Kalyakin’s total was 15 percent. The Communists as 
a whole, who ran in 71 ridings, won only four seats. 
The opposition observers dispute the official figures 
and particularly those for the percentage of voters: 
they maintain that the turnout was about 30-40 
percent of the electorate in the towns and up to 45 
percent in rural areas. In short, they believe that the 
results were falsified.
The US assessment of the elections concurs with 
that of the so-called European parliamentary'’ troika: 
the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the European 
Parliament, and the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe, all of whom resolved to put on 
hold any decision to normalize relations with 
Belarus. The representatives acknowledged that the 
government had made some improvements, but 
that overall the elections still fell short of the 
standards required. In contrast, Russian president 
Vladimir Putin—according to Lukashenka—had 
telephoned his congratulations to his Belarusian 
counterpart on the conducting of democratic 
elections. There has, however, been no public 
statement from President Putin to this effect, 
though the Russian Foreign Ministry' praised the 
elections and the way' in which they were conducted 
on 18 October. In addition, the Russian parliament 
sent a delegation to observe the elections, which 
reported that that they' maintained a high 
democratic standard.
A Prelude to the Presidential Elections 
of 2001
The run-off elections on 29 October saw 53 
ridings contested and an alleged turnout of just over 
50 percent. Prior to the 15 October vote, the 
opposition organized protest marches in cities 
across Belarus. Generally, however, the number of 
those who marched was relatively' small—averaging 
around 2,000-except in the more politicized city of 
Minsk, where an estimated 4,000 demonstrated 
against the elections. The opposition held a press 
conference on 16 October, declaring that the 
boycott represented a victory', citing the statement 
of the US Department of State. The new parliament 
is a strange collection of deputies. Only' 16 are 
affiliated with any political party (mostly 
Communists) and only one major opposition leader 
has a seat—Olga Abramova, the leader of the 
Belarusian branch of the Yabloko faction, which in 
Russia, despite its democratic basis, supports the 
integration of Belarus into Russia.
In some respects, the elections might be written 
off as a non-event. The process was controlled by 
the government, which ensured that very few strong 
oppositionists would be able to stand for office. 
The ultimate result will be another powerless 
assembly, while the president will continue to 
control the upper house that he established in late 
1996. Thus the question arises why' the process was 
conducted at all, what possible benefits might be 
derived from the elections from the government 
perspective?
First and foremost, the elections are widely' 
perceived as a foretaste of the presidential election 
that must take place by November 2001, according 
to the revised Constitution. Those oppositionists 
who insisted on running as independent candidates 
often stressed this point, i.e., that if they' abandoned, 
the electoral process, the electorate would perceive 
them as neglecting its interests and its willingness to 
adopt more democratic practices. Hrushavy’s 
comment was that “The people will vote, and they 
will vote for someone.”2 Moreover this school of 
thought maintained that the chances of electoral 
success in a presidential election if the elections 
were boycotted would be minimal. The aftermath of 
the elections sees a variety of groups that are
Authors’ interview with Henadz Hrushavy, Minsk, 
Belarus, 2 August 2000.
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anticipating the presidential elections a year ahead of 
time. These are as follows:
1. The OSCE AMG led by Wieck will continue 
to play an important role in its efforts to encourage 
debate between the various opposition centers and 
the intransigent government.
2. A new group called “Citizens’ Committee 
‘Elections-2001'” has been established It includes 
politicians, such as Hrushavy, who are democrats, 
but who were denied registration in the October 
2000 elections, and it seeks a leader who can unite 
the various opposition sectors and run against 
Lukashenka.
3. The Supreme Soviet of the 13th Session led by 
Sharetsky has received recognition from the United 
States, which renders it a continuing player in the 
light of the violations of democratic procedure 
during the elections. On 17 October, Sharetsky, 
evidently emboldened by international recognition, 
called for a “Temporary Government of National 
Unity,” indicating his likely participation in the 
process of electing a new president.
4. The democrats on the Right have formed an 
umbrella group called New Freedom, which is led 
by Anatoly Lebedka of the United Civic Party and 
Vintsuk Vyachorka of the Belarusian Popular Front, 
two politicians who were at the forefront of the 
boycott movement. Lebedka has not commented on 
speculation that he will run for president, but he has 
created an association of young politicians and 
appears to be assembling a team in support of his 
candidacy. Lebedka has close Enks with several 
American poEticians and has received some 
financial support from such quarters. OfficiaUy, 
however, Lebedka supports the notion of a single 
candidate from the opposition.
5. Haydukevich’s Liberal-Democratic Party will 
continue to play a role. While it is unEkely to acquire 
mass popularity, Haydukevich is one of the few 
poEticians that have been acceptable to Lukashenka 
in the Dialogue process.
6. The Communist Party of Kalyakin, which has 
representation, however minEnal, in the new 
parEament.
7. The Social Democratic Hramada led by 
Statkevich, a poEtician who has widespread 
recognition from Germany, the European country 
that appears most committed to Belarus
8. Yabloko led by Abramova, whose standing 
has been enhanced despite the lack of credibiEty of
the elections.
9. A group around former Prune Minister 
Mikhail Chyhir, who ran in the October elections 
but was defeated in the run-offs. Chyhir and his 
family have suffered repeated harassment and 
detentions from the government, creating 
considerable sympathy on his behalf from the 
pubEc.
10. The Conservative Christian Party of Zyanon 
Paznyak, which has taken the position of non­
cooperation in any sphere with the government.
11. Stanislau Shushkevich, the former Speaker of 
parEament and the leader of Belarus in the period 
Enmediately after independence. Shushkevich 
recently appeared on Moscow Television’s Vremya 
and announced that he had gathered 700,000 
signatures in support of his candidacy for president. 
Both he and Paznyak ran for president in the 
elections of 1994, gaining between them about 22% 
of the total vote.
12. The intelEgentsia and poEticians who held 
the AE-Belarusian Congress in the summer of 2000, 
which accepted resolutions supporting the 
continued independence of Belarus. There is some 
overlap between this group and the AElections 
2001" committee.
13. A coaEtion of youth organizations, which 
includes the Youth Front, the Youth Society, and 
the Young Christians Social Union, in addition to 
the youth structure of the United Civic Party.
Can the opposition unite its forces to put 
forward a credible candidate to run against 
Lukashenka? The process of the OSCE Dialogue 
and the parEamentary elections has indicated yet 
again that there are serious divisions among the 
opposition, which serve only to bewilder the fragile 
electorate. It seems unEkely that a single candidate 
might emerge from the plethora of poEtical parties 
and different interest groups described above. The 
president has already dismissed the possible 
candidacy of Chyhir, noting that since his former 
Premier could not win a seat in the parEament, it is 
highly unEkely that voters would accept him as a 
candidate for the office of president. PoEticians 
such as Sharetsky and Paznyak have the perhaps 
insurmountable problem of operating from outside 
the country. Paznyak already ran into serious 
problems in this regard in the mock presidential 
elections held by the opposition in the spring of
1999. Opinion poUs over the past three years have
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not suggested that the electorate supports strongly 
any of the various candidates for president, potential 
or actual.
Is it likely that the government will permit a 
democratic election for president? Lukashenka may 
take one of two routes: either the “one against all” 
route that was demonstrated effectively by 
Ukrainian president Leonid Kuchma in October 
1999, when he successfully ran for re-election in 
that country; or else the prevention of registration 
for candidate of opposition leaders. Lukashenka 
already appears to be confident of success, and 
declared that journalists could anticipate 
congratulating him on his future victory.3 More 
ominously, however, he has also stated that if the 
opposition wishes to take part in the presidential 
elections, then it must start to work “constructively” 
with the president.4
The parliamentary elections also demonstrated 
that however flawed the process may have been, the 
Belarusian government is not immune to 
international opinion and criticism. This is evident 
from the sharp comments emanating from the 
Belarusian Foreign Ministry dissenting from the 
views of the representative from Europe. 
Lukashenka has also been sharply critical of the 
Western views on the elections, particularly those of 
the United States. Belarus is in an acute economic 
and social crisis and the government is finding it 
increasingly hard to divorce itself from these 
problems. Both wages and pensions have fallen to 
an all-time low in dollar values (around $32 and $17 
per month respectively). Polls indicate that while 
there is as yet no credible alternative political 
candidate to Lukashenka, the population is anxious 
to see measures in place to improve the standard of 
living.
The Russian Perspective
The elections illustrated the critical role of 
Russia in the future of Belarus. Though the Russia- 
Belarus Union, which has gone through several 
stages, has run into difficulties, Russia is today the 
only country that provides substantial economic and 
political support to the government of Belarus. 
Though a majority of Russians favor the 
incorporation of Belarus, the Putin government
Belarusian Television, 15 October 2000.
4 Sovetskaya Beiomssiya, 20 October 2000.
must take into account the views of the United 
States and the countries of Europe, none of which 
would support the elimination of Belarusian 
independence unilaterally by Russia. The decision 
must be seen to come from within Belarus. The 
most democratic route would therefore be a 
national referendum. However, sociological surveys 
conducted in 1999 revealed that only a minority of 
those polled supported the union with Russia, 
whereas a clear majority favored the continuing 
independence of the Belarusian state.
The second possibility is the legitimization of the 
Union by the leadership organs of Belarus. 
However, the situation is complex. Lukashenka’s 
official term as president, according to the 1994 
Constitution, ended on 20July 1999. The European 
states and the United States have never recogiized 
the validity of the November 1996 Referendum 
through which Lukashenka expanded his powers 
and extended his term in office until November 
2001. Similarly, the smaller version of the parliament 
(120 seats rather than 260) that. replaced the 
Parliament of the 13th Session also lacks 
international recognition. For Russia, an act of 
union between the two states decreed by the 
existing state organs would be unsatisfactory in an 
international climate that does not perceive these 
organs as legitimate. The parliamentary elections of 
October 2000, however, presented a new possibility 
of making the Union a reality, providing that the 
deputies elected were supportive of such an event. 
As a result, Russia took a profound interest in the 
procedures and candidates.
Lukashenka’s attitude toward the Russia-Belarus 
Union is currently ambiguous. In the Yeltsin era 
there seemed to be a realistic hope for the 
Belarusian president that he might ultimately assume 
the presidency of such a Union. Under Putin, this 
hope has faded. The new Russian president appears 
more inclined to favor a single territory, i.e., to 
incorporate Belarus into Russia as a western 
province, without any corresponding body to 
administer the amalgamated state. In such a Russia, 
there would clearly be no role for Lukashenka. 
Consequently, some of Lukashenka’s speeches, 
paradoxically, have sounded patriotic. He is 
unwilling, publicly, to give up independence if 
Belarus is not to be treated as an equal partner. The 
Putin administration, however, must remain a major 
player in Belarus and perceives for itself a significant 
role now that the United States has so publicly
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distanced itself from the authoritarian republic. 
The new US ambassador to Belarus, Michael
Kozak, caused much anger in Minsk official circles 
with his comment that Belarus today is the “Cuba 
of Europe.” However, the republic appears to be 
increasingly isolated, almost a backwater of Soviet- 
style repression amid a sea of general change. With 
the fall of Slobodan Milosevic in Yugoslav, 
Alyaksander Lukashenka is the only remaining 
dictator of the old Communist style remaining in 
Europe. Opposition demonstrations have frequently 
made an analogy between the two leaders, who have
long been on friendly terms. It is a comparison that 
the Belarusian president can ill afford to ignore, 
though for the moment his position remains secure.
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